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Narcissus and the Moon: Parallax in
Early Modern Images
Narcisse et la lune : la parallaxe dans les images de la première modernité
Davide Messina
AUTHOR'S NOTE
This essay expands on my paper “Don’t think, reflect! Parallaxing Narcissus in Baroque
science and arts”, presented at the 12th AISV-IAVS Conference (Lund, August 22-24,
2019). My special thanks to Maria Giulia Dondero.
“What would it have looked like if it had looked as
if the Earth turned on its axis?” (Anscombe 1971:
151).
 
1. Introduction: minimal complexity
1 After the formal experiments and excesses of  the late Renaissance,  as suggested by
Erwin Panofsky, the Italian Baroque marked “a reversion to nature, both stylistically
and emotionally” (1995: 36). Instead of striving to regain a form of classical balance, a
new naturalistic paradigm was developed by realigning the arts with the Aristotelian
view that  “nature  is  the  principle  of  movement  and  change”  (Physics  200b12).  The
Florentine painters of the fifteenth century served as an unlikely model for the visual
arts of the Copernican revolution. More than motion as a “mere change of place”, as
Bernard Berenson explained (1896: 50-56), the representation of movement paved the
way for a new aesthetics that not only imitates life, but enhances the “sense of vitality”:
the  artist  extracts  the “significance  of  movements”,  simulating  action  in  our  mind
through an interplay of memory and imagination that is (or feels) more intense than real
life; in other words, “we imagine ourselves imitating all the movements, and exerting
the force required for them—and all without the least effort on our side” (ibid. 55).
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2 Commenting on Berenson’s “theory (if it can be called that)”, David Freedberg pointed
out that there is still limited research by art historians on “the felt imitation of the
representation of movement and action in a work of art, or in images more generally”
(2009: 73). This is surprising, if we consider the obvious relevance of this research for
art  history;  but  even more so,  if  we look at  the extensive work carried out  by the
cognitive sciences on this topic, and the implications of the recent discovery of “mirror
neurons” for  the arts  (ibid.  73-74).  Interdisciplinary research on the significance  and
representation of movement in the visual arts, however, can be well supplemented with
semiotic studies. By endorsing the “double reference” of sense between perception and
meaning-making, as Victoria Welby suggested at the turn of the last century (1983: 48),
semiotics represents “a bridge between the humanities and the sciences” (Perron et al.
2000), and its diverse tradition offers some of the most comprehensive approaches.
3 The question of the semiotic nature of mirrors is instrumental to the analysis of this
study. A standard reference is the work of Umberto Eco, who devoted several essays to
explaining why “the mirror image is not a sign” (1986: 202), and why this is a positive
principle for semiotics. While holding a “rear-view mirror” to the development of visual
semiotics (Fabbri 2002), his arguments also open a window to explore alternative views
in cognitive semiotics (Sonesson 2003), most notably on the formation, functioning, and
performance of self-awareness. After all, semiotics is not just about the definition of a
sign. Eco uses the myth of Narcissus to argue—as far as we can “trust myths”—that the
experience of mirrors and signs are “linked to one another in a circle”, but within the
spell  of  this  circular  argument  (or  assumption)  we  remain  uncertain  on  “whether
semiosis is at the basis of perception or vice versa” (1986: 202-203). Leaving aside the
debate on criteria and definitions,  the circularity  of  the question is  productive across
different  disciplines.  In  particular,  this  question  is  directly  relevant  to  the  early
modern history of painting: Narcissus emerged in the Renaissance as the “inventor of
painting”  (Alberti  2011:  46),  and  semiotics  shares  with  this  invention,  from  the
beginning, the art of turning “absence into presence” (Damisch 2010: 304).
4 The understanding of mirrors as a “potential semiotic kernel” of the pictorial arts, as
suggested  by  Yuri  Lotman (1990:  55),  is  one  way  of  rethinking  painting in  the  early
modern  period.  Not  only  mirrors  contributed  to  the  modern  development  of
perspective, but they raised the awareness of the presence and position of an observer in an
image. In visual semiotics, the model of “uttered enunciation” (énonciation enocée) offers
a dynamic, advanced, and nuanced methodology to study “the relationship between the
image and its observer as inscribed within the image itself” (Dondero 2020: 2). Drawing
from linguistics, where enunciation describes the passage from a virtual language system
to an actual utterance,  the presence and position of an observer in an image can be
derived from certain  traces  of  the  process  that  mark the  subject,  space,  and  time of
enunciation (I, here, now) at both ends of the production and perception of an image. Unlike
a  linguistic  structure,  however,  the  imitation  of  a  moving  observer in  the  visual  arts
foregrounds  the  forms in which an image  sees  itself  as  a moving  image,  as  it  will  be
discussed. It is a case of “impersonal enunciation”, as Christian Metz explained it for
film theory,  and it  unfolds  “by means of  reflexive  constructions” (2016:  10),  namely
through  an  internal  splitting of  the  image.  This  impersonal  and  reflexive mode  of
enunciation reframes the question of the semiotic nature of mirrors in a way that is
positively  consistent  with  Baroque  painting  and  visual  culture  at  large,  where  the
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“subjective space” of the observer is reconfigured and experienced from the point of
view of the image (Fontanille 1989).
5 Research on optical devices as apparatuses of enunciation reveals a major yet still largely
understudied phenomenon in early modern images, namely the presence of parallax
effects. The parallax is “the difference in the projection of a static scene as viewpoint
changes relative to the scene” (Wilson & Keil 2001: 227), namely the apparent movement
of an object relative to a given background, as caused by the movement of the observer.
The proverbial idiot who looks at the finger, when it points at the Moon, can see this
effect  simply by moving the head,  or by looking at  the finger one eye at  a time:  a
differential perspective is projected onto the finger, which appears displaced relative to
the Moon. Parallax and distance are inversely proportional, and so the movement of the
observer must be much more significant to produce an apparent displacement of the
Moon. This phenomenon has intrigued philosophers over the centuries, from Aristotle
to  Slavoj  Žižek.  It  suggested  an  effective  method  to  measure  distances,  but  it  also
contributed to question the semiotic difference between objective and subjective space in
images. With Žižek, we can also define it as a “minimal difference which divides one
and  the  same  object  from  itself”,  namely  as  a  difference  that  appears  “as  such”
(2006: 18).
6 From a cognitive point of view, parallax cues are integral to our sense of reality. This is
particularly relevant to differentiate mirror images, which are affected by parallax like
the real things that we see in reflection, from two-dimensional images like paintings,
which  do  not  seem  to  change  when  the  observer  moves.  In  fact,  when  seen  from
different angles, two-dimensional images also display an apparent movement relative to
themselves (Hochberg 1994: 55)—like the eyes of a portrait that seem to follow us around
the room—, but this may not be immediately obvious. Because of their elusive nature,
parallax effects in painting are generally considered absent before the avant-gardes,
when they are exaggerated to capture the experience of a moving observer; and they
have not been studied in relation to the visual arts until the invention of the motion
pictures, where they sustain the illusion of reality. The reasonable oversight should not
be taken for an argument. To see the ways in which these effects appear in the visual
culture of the early modernity, we should consider how the felt imitation of movement
emerges in reflection, and how the transformations of the point of view are enunciated in
images.
7 The early modern period provides a unique and critical context for this research. As it
will  be  argued,  the uncanny realism of  Baroque painting proceeds from a system of
artificial parallax,  which challenged and changed the “period eye” of the Renaissance
(Baxandall  1988:  29-108).  Nothing  like  the  radical  symbolic  shift  that  displaced the
observer from the centre of the universe, as the Copernican revolution did, could have
made the arts of time and space converge in images of a world in motion.  By positing
motion as the “paramount analogy” of sense, as Welby suggested (1983: xvii), aesthetics
and semiotics shared the knowledge of “how thinking in the round and in motion like
our earth, differs from thinking on the flat and the fixed” (ibid. 233). In astronomy, the
absence of observable parallax of the stars was debated with dramatic consequences, as the
decisive  yet  elusive  demonstration of  the Copernican hypothesis:  “To prove that  the
Earth in fact revolved in a wide orbit around the Sun,” as Alan Hirshfeld explains, “the
parallax of just one star—any star—had to be detected. The hunt for stellar parallax was
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on” (2013:  47).  We can hardly justify  the assumption that  the visual  arts  remained
indifferent to this pressing debate in the science of cosmic appearances. 
8 The Moon held a crucial position in the early modern hunt for stellar parallax, at least
for three concurrent reasons. First, it manifested the sweet spot of the observable parallax
in  the  universe.  While  the  parallax  of  the  Moon  could  be  readily  measured  with
observations from two distant points on Earth, because of the distance, not even the
early  telescopes were powerful enough to  detect  any apparent  displacement of  the
celestial bodies beyond its sphere. Second, in the pre-Copernican universe, the Moon
marked the threshold between a motionless Earth, subject to time and change, and the
movement of the heavenly, eternal and ethereal spheres. This is a semiotic threshold:
the Moon “signifies in us” (in nobis significat) the “continuous movement of the soul and
the body”, as Marsilio Ficino wrote in a letter (Gombrich 1972: 41). Precisely because it
represented a limit of knowledge and a semiotic principle informed by change and motion,
the interpretation of the Moon was a benchmark for parallax thinking in the wake of the
Copernican revolution, namely for the ways in which we signify our movement in our
vision of the universe. Third, the Moon had been classically imagined as a cosmic mirror of
the Earth.  While  this  idea had been long disproved (and even derided),  still  in  the
seventeenth century Galileo had to demonstrate that  the Moon could not be like a
mirror at all; at the same time, his telescopic observations reflected a new vision of the
Earth and the arts at once:  “Wrong in one sense,  those who viewed the Moon as a
mirror were right in another” (Montgomery 1999: 117).
9 Cultural images are often persistent because they are nested in natural language and
common sense, preserved and transmitted in myths. Classical mythology connects the
liminal  position  of  the  Moon to  the  goddess  Artemis  (or  Diana),  who was  also  the
goddess  of  the hunt.  It  was Artemis  who turned Narcissus  into the “eager hunter”
(venandi studiosus) of his own reflection (Vinge 1967: 23). The image of the Moon as a
cosmic mirror of the Earth acquires here another dimension—and the interpretation of
The Face that Appears on the Moon, as Plutarch discussed it in his dialogue, is transformed
like  that  of  the  beautiful  hunter.  In  a  reverse  myth  of  the  “protophilosopher”
(Blumenberg 2015) who saw in water the principle of all things, and ironically tumbled
into a well while watching the stars at night, Narcissus discovers the universe in a dark
pool, staring at his own eyes like “twin stars” (geminum sidus), as Ovid writes in the
Metamorphoses (III, 418).
10 To sketch the conditions of minimal complexity for a theory of parallax in early modern
images  across  the  arts  and  sciences,  this  essay  puts  forward  two  overarching
arguments. First, it contends that the debate on stellar parallax informs, integrates,
and transforms the theory of perspective in the late Renaissance. Second, it argues that
the parallax view sheds new light  on the representation  of  movement in  the Baroque
visual culture. After outlining how the semiotic use of mirrors in painting enabled the
possibility of representing the change of perspective, this essay shows how this process
intersects the general view of the Copernican revolution, inscribing parallax effects in
images with an intentional aesthetic force. As painting reduces the background to a
dark cosmic surface, parallax effects appear through minimal, reflexive displacements of
the object and the observer within the same image. This framework is developed with a
focus on Giordano Bruno’s art of memory, where the parallax view enables a semiotic
“embrace”  (complexus)  of  the  movement  of  images.  In  painting,  analysis  focuses  on
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Caravaggio’s Narcissus (ca. 1597), where the observer reflects the point of view of an
image that appears motionless but sees itself as a moving image.
 
2. Renaissance in perspective: speculating on
ornaments
11 In  the  Renaissance,  the  development  of  linear  perspective provided  painting  with  a
“plastic space” that remained apparently unchanged until the avant-gardes (Francastel
1963). Forces and actions were under the rule of a fixed point of view. The semiotics of
this space, however, laboured and transformed the early modern visual culture from
the inside out. As argued by Heinrich Wölfflin, plastic values emerged more vividly from
movement than  from  masses,  from  shadows than  from  lines,  manifesting  a  certain
“tension” (Spannung) between the meaning of forms and the sense of the whole: a distinct
“sense  of  direction”  (Gefühl  für  Richtung)  will  characterize  the  painterly  style of  the
Baroque (1964:  58).  The growing significance  of  the  ornaments is  instructive,  and it
extends  far  beyond  Donatello’s  invention  of  the  putti as  “ornament  in  action”
(Dempsey  2001:  34).  In  architecture,  a  compelling  example  is  in  Michelangelo’s
vestibule  of  the  Laurentian Library  (1524-1534),  where  the  pilasters  that  frame the
aediculae,  intervalled by pairs  of  receding columns,  “become wider as  they expand
upwards,  and seem to rise more quickly than straight unexpanding ones” (Wölfflin
1964:  59).  An  ornamental  line comes  to  the  foreground  from  the  edges,  and  its
acceleration signifies a movement directed towards the observer.
12 The transition to the new style is more organic than the narrative opposition could
make one assume. Like the seemingly decorative scroll at the top of the title-page of
the Well-Tempered  Clavier  (1722),  which is  in  fact  a  diagram of  Bach’s  secret  tuning
system,  the  Baroque  art  of  the  ornament  developed  and  tempered some  essential
motives of the Renaissance. In paintings such as Birth of Venus and Spring (ca. 1482),
Botticelli gave new significance to inanimate objects like hair, drapery, flowers or foliage
to  tackle  “the  most  difficult  problem  in  all  art”,  as  Aby  Warburg  so  perceptively
explained (1999:  141),  namely  the  problem of  capturing  “images  of  life  in  motion”
(Bilder des bewegten Lebens). The precision of the ornaments contrasts with the vague
background, but the forces that animate them become visible, expanding perspective
through an impersonal narrative of motions and emotions, actions and passions. Already
with the sensibility of a Baroque musician, Botticelli’s perspective hinges on ornaments
as expressive elements, which capture movement and can move the observer too.
13 In this framework, the study of the transition from the Renaissance to the Baroque arts
can draw valuable insights from Henri Focillon’s idea of “speculating on the ornament”
(1989: 66-68). The speculation has to be understood in its double Latin sense: on the one
hand, the ornament is “a kind of observatory”, a specula, from which the “life of forms”
can be observed across the figurative and plastic arts. On the other hand, the ornament
is a kind of mirror, a speculum, which enhances the observer’s perception of forms with
a force of self-signification: not only it does “exist in and of itself, but it also shapes its
own environment—to which it imparts a form” (ibid. 34), so that “form signifies only
itself” (ibid.  66).  The same is  for the Baroque aesthetics  of  light and shadow, which
“seems to signify something in its own right alongside form”, as Wölfflin wrote (2015:
148). Progressively, the reflexive and impersonal function of the ornaments reconfigures the
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definition of forms in painting too. On the painterly surface, perspectives of curved
lines begin to appear, at once abstract and naturalistic like a rinceau in a classical frieze.
14 The new glass mirrors that became available in the Renaissance were pivotal to the
creation of this new sense of direction in painting. As opposed to polished metal, the
new glass mirrors offered a much clearer reflection, and what this meant for modern
perspective was even more consequential than what they made as optical devices. In
fact,  the “popular standard for measuring pictorial  ‘realism’” in Renaissance art,  as
argued by Samuel Edgerton, “was not by direct comparison to the phenomenal world,
but by comparison to the novelty of mirror reflection” (2009: 52). At the same time, as
the  mirror  surface  could  not  be  immaculate,  painting  integrated  the  marks of  an
artificial  device in a  common framework of  reality  effects.  Observers and ornaments
were connected in a direct and dynamic way, fixing the marginal space of the image as
a  frame  of reference  for  its  depth.  One  of  the  most  productive  paradoxes  of  this
situation was the raised awareness that a minimal shift of the observer’s point of view
would prove the artificial nature of perspective, while enhancing the sense of reality. 
15 An ingenious experiment by Filippo Brunelleschi at the beginning of fifteenth-century
Florence, which became the foundation myth of modern perspective, may serve as an
illustration. According to Antonio Manetti’s account (1970: 44-46), the architect painted
a small panel of about “half a braccio” (around 30cm), representing the façade of St
John’s Baptistery in perspective, as seen from the portal of the Florentine Cathedral.
Then, he turned the panel and, in correspondence of the vanishing point, he made a
conic hole that was as small as a “lentil” (lenta) and worked as a natural lens. Bystanders
were invited to observe the Baptistery through this  little  hole,  while holding a flat
mirror in front of the panel with the other hand. By adjusting the arms’ distance, the
reflection of the painting would line up with the natural perspective, and the virtual image
behind the mirror would coincide with the appearance of the real building.
16 If we consider that Brunelleschi had just lost the competition to design a set of relief
sculptures for the doors of the Baptistery, it becomes clear that he aimed at capturing
the plastic qualities of the façade with a more profound illusion, from life. This may have
been just a thought experiment, but it did not simply want to prove a new technique.
With a bold conceptual step forward, he redefined the experience of pictorial realism as
a relationship between two simulacra. We can say that Brunelleschi “put forward and
actualized” (mise innanzi et in atto) not only perspective, as Manetti writes (1970: 43), but
the semiotic potential of mirrors, by turning their use for self-portraits into a device for
representing the process of image formation. The device embraces a new way of “thinking
in painting”, as Hubert Damisch explains it (1994: 446): the “origin” of perspective is a
hole that appears like a “stain” in the mirror,  a mark of the presence of  an observer
behind the  painting  and,  at  the  same time,  of  a  significant absence that  the  mirror
enunciates as a fiction of the image itself.
17 Leon Battista Alberti’s paradigmatic metaphor of painting “as an open window” (pro
aperta  fenestra)  (2011:  39)  connotes  Brunelleschi’s  perspective  as  a  way  of  “looking
through” (perspicere)  an image.  This  is  an idea that is  consistent with the medieval
general definition of a sign, as something that “stands for” (pro) something else (Eco
1986: 213). At the very beginning of his treatise On painting (1435), Alberti defines a
“sign” (signum) as a minimal unit of the visible, namely of what can be “observed by the
eye”  on  a  surface:  the  “point”  (punctum)  is  the  minimal  sign,  and  the  origin  of
“painting” (pingo) may be related to it; the line is a continuous sequence of points, or
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the movement of a point; finally, the surface is a composition of multiple lines, “like
close threads in a cloth” (2011: 23).  As such, the window cuts through the semiotic
tension of a textum that stands between two ideal surfaces: at one end, images appear to
form in the eye “as if on an animated mirror” (ibid. 28); at the other end, the ultimate
textual object of representation is a “story” (historia), aimed at simulating and stimulating
the “motions of the mind” (motus animi), because “these motions of the mind are known
from movements of the body” (ibid. 61).
18 We touch here on a remarkable intersection between visual and cognitive semiotics. As
the role  of  movement in the perception of  depth is  gradually  understood,  pictorial 
perspective expands into the significant experience of the “active observer”, giving rise
to representations of “motion perspective” (Gibson 1950: 117-144). Alberti prefers to
leave such questions to the philosophers, and warns that excessive movements of the
subject  of  representation produce  “errors”,  for  instance  when  “in  the  same  figure
[simulacrum]  the breast  and buttocks appear under a unique view, a  thing which is
certainly  not  only  impossible  to  do  but  also  very  unpleasant  to  see”  (2011:  65).
However,  he  also  acknowledges  that  similar  errors  occur  in  medieval  and  modern
painting alike, so there may be some stylistic reason behind them. The Baroque will
come to see them as expressive deformations.
19 The  semiotic  use  of  mirrors  in  early  modern  painting  shows  a  way  to  integrate  a
differential point of view in perspective and perception, enabling the representation of
the  observer’s  movement  too.  Velázquez’  Venus  with  Mirror (ca. 1651)  offers  a  good
example to see a similar effect, which is now commonly used in cinema (Bertamini,
Latto, & Spooner 2003): if we see the mirror image as the painted subject would see it,
the mirror is looking at us. The mirror transformations of Brunelleschi’s experiment
can  be  associated  with  this  semiotic  development.  First,  against  a  common
misapprehension, it should be noted that mirrors do not rotate images on the vertical
axis, reversing right and left. As explained by Eco, between the observer and the mirror
image there is “the same congruence we observe when we press blotting paper onto a
page written with fresh ink” (1986: 202-203)—or that of a wet “plaster mask” (cretea
persona) slapped against a column, as Lucretius vividly described it (De rerum natura IV,
296-297). This means that the reflected panel could only coincide with its real object if
the painter had used the image of another mirror as a model, otherwise the reflection
would appear incongruent. The real rotation of the mirror image happens in depth,
reversing  front  and  back,  splitting  the  observer  and  superimposing  a  form of  self-
signification on  the  most  impersonal optical  phenomena,  like  on  a  glass  window—as
Leonardo put it, perspective is a way of seeing the world as “marked” (segnato) from a
certain point of view, as if from “behind a plane of glass” (1970: 53).
20 The  symmetry of  the  Baptistery  serves  well  this  complex  strategy  of  mirror
transformations. It has not been noted that it also enters in dialogue, and perhaps more
crucially,  with a medieval way of representing three-dimensional space in painting,
which is known as reverse perspective. In this style of perspectival representation, the
observer becomes the vanishing point of the image, so that forms seem to expand towards
the background, instead of converging. As it happens, below the horizon, the frontal
view of the octagonal structure of the Baptistery presents the same diverging sides of a
rectangular form in reverse perspective, as we can see it in the cradle of the Birth of the
Virgin (ca. 1310-1315) in the Chapel of Studenica, Serbia (Edgerton 1975: 11-12).
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21 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Pavel Florensky applied the aesthetics of
reverse perspective to the study of  the Russian sacred “icons”,  which flourished in
parallel to the Italian Renaissance. As we can see in Rublev’s Trinity (c. 1411), the sacred
icons represent the world simultaneously from at least two points of view, from the side
and  from  above.  The  two  viewpoints  set  the  icon  in  motion.  To  use  the  classical
definition of Plato’s Timaeus (37d5),  time itself  is  manifested as a “moving image of
eternity” (eikōn kinēton aiōnos). In fact, Alberti’s perspective also assumed a lateral point
of  view of  the  observer  above  the  line  of  the  horizon,  from  which  he  drew  the
transversal lines that stand for the division of space in depth (2011: 41-42),  but the
scene  is  constructed  and  observed  at  rest.  Renewing  Alberti’s  metaphor,  instead,
Florensky writes that the world of the icons appears as seen “from [the window] of an
automobile”  (2002:  269).  With  its  polycentric  and  dynamic representation,  reverse
perspective emerged as one of the generative forces of modernist painting, although
the  technology  of  the  motion  pictures  overshadowed  its  ascendance  in  the  avant-
gardes.
22 In  a  semiotic  study  on  Russian  icons,  Boris  Uspensky  suggested  that  the  cognitive
structure of reverse perspective can be grasped from the way in which the enunciation
of a moving observer is reported inside the space of representation, as it happens when
children turn the sheet while drawing (1976: 43). An inspired detail in Brunelleschi’s
perspective panel may point to a similar apparatus of uttered enunciation.  Instead of
painting  the  sky  around  the  Baptistery,  the  architect  glued  a  cut-out  strip  of
“burnished silver” (ariento brunito), which reflected the passage of the clouds above the
building  (Manetti  1970:  45).  As  an  ornament,  this  detail  could  be  compared  to  the
overlaid silver sheet of a Russian icon, which covers the background around the sacred
subject—but  its  reflective  quality  unfolds  a  whole  new  system  of  image
transformations, which is almost hidden above the painting like Bach’s secret tuning
system. The background changes of the sky animate the mass of the building with an
atmospheric tension. While the gaze moves simultaneously upwards and forwards, the
faint reflection of the clouds captures the passage of time as a pure difference of the image
relative to itself. Perspective is charged with a new sense of reality, forms vibrate like the
silver  lines  of  religious  icons,  which  express  invisible  forces like  “an  electric  or
magnetic field” (Florensky 2002: 206). With this ornamental line of speculation, finally,
Brunelleschi introduces a new metamorphosis in the history of images: in the alchemy
of the silver strip, the peep show aspires to the art of the moving pictures.
23 Brunelleschi’s idea of turning the perspective panel must have been precisely
motivated, if not imposed, by the intention of reflecting the background movement of
the clouds above the Cathedral, not just any cloud in the sky. The mirror compounds
the  painting  with  this  movement.  We  can  say  that  the  silver  strip  represents  an
“extension” (dilazione) of painting, as Manetti writes of the mirror (1970: 45), but also a
semiotic deferral of the reality of movement, which sets the stage for a dramatic change
of linear perspective. Against the passing clouds, the outline of the Cathedral stands for
a certain difference in perception between the figure and the background, namely it
functions  as  a  “predictor  of  the  effect  of  movement  parallax”,  as  Ernst  Gombrich
explained (1982: 201). Depth is perceived with movement in still images too. This was a
transformative idea, still unexplored in its originality and influence. While the mirror
fixes the external observer as a reflexive frame of reference inside the perspective, the
silver  strip  opens  an  impersonal space  for  parallax,  where  the  image  appears  in
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transformation  relative  to  itself,  like  the  clouds  in  the  sky.  The  progressive
understanding and use of parallax in painting gave perspective a whole new sense of
direction, leading the visual arts to cross the path of a new science of the celestial
motions.
 
3. Baroque in parallax: starry enunciators
24 While there are several studies on “poetics of perspective” in the Renaissance (Elkins
1994), as well as on the new sense of the Baroque for “affect and movement at all costs”
(Wölfflin 2015: 92), there is little or no scholarly research on the representation of the
change  of  perspective,  namely  on  the  modes  of  embedding  parallax in  early  modern
images. Accordingly, it is assumed that “motion parallax was missing from traditional
art  forms”  (Solso  1996:  174),  at  least  before  the  early  cinematic  experience  that
accompanied  the  modernist  avant-gardes  in  painting,  when  we  find  such  striking
examples as Cézanne’s Still Life with Fruit Basket (ca. 1890). As plausible as it might seem,
the assumption is not tenable as an argument. The lack of evidence is predicated on a
certain idea of modern perspective, whose convention of a monocular fixed observer still
conditions the way we look at images prior to the experience of the motion pictures.
The  transitional  aesthetics  of  the  late  Renaissance  will  designate  here  a  site  of 
enunciation of the parallax view across the arts and science.
25 As a matter of fact, several examples of parallax can be gleaned in early modern art, but
they may be significant without being as conspicuous. In painting, parallax effects may
appear in elusive details, like the changing angle of reflection of a shiny object, or the
blurred pattern of a fabric. The paragon of elusiveness is Mona Lisa’s smile, where the
aesthetics of peripheral vision composes and conceals a diagram of the motor muscles
of the lips (Windsor, RCIN 919055v), coming to life as the eyes of the observer move
away from the central focus (Livingstone 2002: 71-73). Leonardo was so aware of this
phenomenon that he advised to compose paintings in such a way that it would “make
so  little  difference  when  the  eye  of  the  spectator  moves”  (1970: 273).  A  minimal
difference is all it takes. We can find a subtle use of parallax already in Masaccio’s Trinity
(ca. 1427) in Santa Maria Novella, Florence, where God’s head is not perfectly aligned
with the central axis of the Brunelleschian vault, so that the observer feels slightly off-
centre in front of the fresco: it is a “structural intuition”, as Martin Kemp calls it (2006:
8,  22).  In contrast,  we only need to consider the dome painted by Andrea Pozzo in
Sant’Ignazio (ca. 1685), Rome, to see how the markedly eccentric perspective of a moving
observer is integral to the Baroque visual culture. It is the presence of parallax tensions
in the new vision of the Copernican universe that underlies the explosion of the frame in
Baroque ceiling paintings.
26 In the early modern period, parallax effects are most striking when the images are
produced through projection devices, and especially when curved mirrors are used as
lenses. One of the devices that came to prominence was the camera obscura. It is possible
that Brunelleschi used it for his first perspective painting, and Leonardo noted that, by
moving the “lips” (labri) of its opening, as in a fleeting smile, “the images of immovable
objects  are  made  to  move”  (1970:  46).  Parallax  effects  are  most  visible  when  a
movement  of  the  device  alters  perspective  and  focus.  This  movement  introduces
distortions in the process of image formation, but their systemic nature may also conceal
them. Very much like the unprepared and unresolved dissonances that characterize the
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music  of  this  period,  such deformations  become expressive elements.  The  elongated
necks and columns of Mannerist painting jump at us like trails of light against the night
sky. This is a key feature of Baroque realism, which “is not an attempt to get the objects
as they are, but vision as it is”, as Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris explain (2013: 29); with
this, a “paradoxical process” takes place in Baroque science: as the eye of the painter
identifies with an optical device, the human observer “disappears” from optics ( ibid.
15-16). We should add that a new observer emerges as a subject in semiotics, negotiating
the space and the signs of objectivity.
27 Although  we  do  not  usually  associate  the  Baroque  arts  with  science,  the  semiotic
approach allows us to see how the development and use of optical devices in painting
performs the same staged  objectivity of  the Baroque scientific  discourse.  In  semiotic
terms, the traces of a process are marks of enunciation and produce effects of subjectivity.
In  a  scientific  text,  these  marks  often  tend  to  be  erased  or  disguised,  so  that  the
“discourse” (discours) is textualized as “history” (histoire),  as Émile Benveniste called
the  two  basic  modes  of  linguistic  enunciation  (1971:  206-209).  As  opposed  to  the
discursive presence of a speaker and a listener, which is openly subjective, the evidence
of a scientific text appears to speak for itself, as a story without a narrator. The invisible
narrator is  analogous  to  the  “disappearing  observer”  in  modern  optics,  but  the
rhetorical strategy also elicits Alberti’s idea of a visual “story”, which simulates action
and dissimulates the act of representation.
28 The strategy of historical objectivity can be recognized in the anonymous address to
the reader that  Andreas Osiander wrote for Copernicus’  On the  Revolutions (1543)—a
book that “gave rise to a revolution that it had scarcely enunciated”, as Thomas Kuhn
wryly put it (1957: 135). Osiander writes that the task of the astronomer is to compose
the “history” (historia) of the celestial motions through careful and “artful” (artificiosa)
observation (Copernicus 1992: xx). This work is historical in its reconstruction of the
causes of motions in time, and it is artful in the formulation of hypotheses that only
stand for the true causes, which are metaphysical and remain unattainable. Copernicus
employs  a  comparable  rhetoric  when  he  suggests  that  the  “motions  of  the  stars”
described  in  his  book  are  only  “embellished”  (ornatos)  by  his  “new  and  marvelous
hypotheses” (ibid. xix). With a flight of etymological arguments, he notes that the Latin
word for the “universe” (mundus) means “purity and ornament”, like the Greek kosmos,
and the meaning of the “heaven” (caelum) is that of “carving” (caelati), as if the most
beautiful forms were chiselled in it (ibid. 7)—in fact, the traces of the first maker (and
first mover) of the universe are “concealed” (celati); the “course” (cursus) of the stars is
not observable; and the history of forms explains itself as a discourse of the ornaments.
Along  this  ornamental  line  of  speculation,  Copernicus  sets  the  Earth  in  motion  by
inscribing the observer’s movement in a universal process of reflexive and impersonal 
enunciation,  as  the  marked  “part”  of  an  image  that  sees  itself  as  a  moving  image:
“Whatever motion appears in the firmament is due [ex parte], not to it, but to the Earth”
(1985: 81).
29 Against this backdrop, elaborating on the idea of Galileo’s  Starry Messenger (Sidereus
nuncius,  1610),  we  can  say  that  Baroque  images  highlight  the  presence  of  starry
enunciators, namely markers of the parallax view that challenged the cosmology of the
late Renaissance. These markers are inscribed in images across the early modern arts
and science as delegated observers (nuncii), as Bruno Latour explains (1999: 71-72): as for
stellar  parallax itself,  these markers may appear  absent,  but  their  presence must  be
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supposed, and the traces of their action can be derived from the sense of movement that
they bring into images. Like the theōroi of classical spectacles (Nightingale 2004: 4-5),
we can also say, the “observers” are also the “messengers” of a theory that changes the
experience of the visual arts; the movement of images is their message. The language of
observation closely  followed  this  transformation  in  visual  thinking:  for  instance,
Galileo’s discovery of four new “stars” (stellae) around Jupiter, as we read in the Starry
Messenger, meant that it was possible to imagine other moons in the universe.
30 The eye of the astronomer meets the theory of painting through the new perspective
device that Galileo called perspicillum, namely the telescope. The drawings of the Moon
that he produced from his observations apply the general laws of perspective, which he
had studied at the Academy of the Drawing Arts in Florence; but they also exemplify
how  the  telescope  affected  representation  with  significant  parallax  effects.  Some
details  appear  distorted,  exaggerated  or  even  incongruous,  mainly  because  of  the
inevitable changes in focus of the drawing process. Not only had Galileo to make his
sketches during the observations at night, under the dim light of a candle, and his eyes
had to adjust continuously between the eyepiece and the paper; but the telescope could
not provide detailed image of the whole Moon, so that the different parts had to be
pieced together. Finally, it is important to note that the sheet of paper was turned over
different sessions,  but  the drawings are not  dated,  so that  the intended sequence  of
images must  be  derived  from  an  overall  interpretation  of  the  observations.
Interpretation is open at both ends of production and perception of these images.
31 Through the telescope, the Moon appeared like the kind of irregular and imperfect 
pearl that the Portuguese jewellers of the period called barroca—and just like a Baroque
pearl, it manifested an ornamental line of speculation that transformed the science of
appearances in the early modern visual culture.  Besides the technical issues,  in fact,
some details of Galileo’s drawings appear as intentional deformations, or even figments of
imagination. One of his most surprising inventions can be found in the engravings of
the Moon for the Starry Messenger. In the lower part of the terminator, i.e. on vertical
line that divides the dark from the sunlit side of the Moon, Galileo draws a large crater
that  cannot  be clearly  mapped on the lunar surface,  but  it  is  so  prominent  that  it
should  be  visible  with  the  naked  eye.  Its  representation  would  have  enthused  any
Baroque  painter,  but  it  is  not  a  real  feature.  The  crater  serves  as  a  magnified
illustration  of  the  dynamics  of  light  and  shadow on  an  irregular,  concave  surface,
creating a dramatic contrast with the equally textured but convex surface of the Moon.
We can contrast it with one of Galileo’s wash drawings (Florence, MS 48, 28r), where the
detail of a crater appears next to the Moon. In this position, detached and enshrouded
in a  light  brush stroke,  the  detail  may be  interpreted as  a  separate  celestial  body,
something like a comet—unless one wants to consider it  as  a simple blot  of  ink.  By
suggesting  a  connection  between  the  crater,  as  a  detail  of  the  Moon,  and  the
representation of a comet, as a distinct celestial body moving close to the Moon, we
may gain some insight into the semiotics of cosmological observations.
32 In this interpretation, the detail of the crater functions as a starry enunciator,  and it
marks a position in the long debate on the nature of the comets. The passage of these
eccentric  bodies in  the  sky  introduced the  possibility  of  movement  and  change  in  the
representation of the universe, extending the experience of the sublunary world to all
celestial bodies. As the comets appeared to be moving without showing any measurable
parallax, astronomers generally concluded that they were located beyond the sphere of
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the  Moon.  Galileo’s  alternative  explanation  was  that  the  they  were  “mere
appearances”, and more precisely effects of reflection of the sunlight on earthly vapours
—something like the rainbow, which does not seem to change position when we move.
This  erroneous  conclusion  was  consistent  with  a  certain  idea  of  objectivity.  In  his
Discourse on the Comets (1619), in fact, Galileo argued that parallax “operates reliably in
real and permanent things whose essence is not affected by anyone’s vision”, but it
“does not function in mere appearances” (1960: 36-37). In the apparent absence of the
minimal signs of parallax, the discourse “of” (delle) the comets becomes part of a history of
the moving images, a fiction of “wandering simulacra” (ibid. 36).
33 The detection of enunciation marks in cosmological observations can be compared with
the interpretation of the spots that appear on the Moon—the “dark signs” (segni bui), as
Dante called them (Paradise II, 49). These spots could always be seen with the naked eye,
and they elicited various speculations on their origin and meaning. In essence, they
were understood as marks of the threshold position of the Moon between the dark
matter  of  the  Earth  and  the  crystalline  substance  of  the  higher  spheres,  with  the
relative  moral  connotations.  Despite  being  clearly  visible  and  coloured  by
interpretations, the lunar spots remained absent from painting until the early modern
period, when the arts pursued “a true naturalism based upon an empirical appreciation
of the beauty, form, and concreteness of earthly phenomena” (Montgomery 1999: 63).
In fact, as Gombrich argued for the “discovery of appearances” in the Renaissance, a
more  realistic  representation  of  the  Moon  was  due  “not  so  much  to  a  careful
observation of nature as to the invention of pictorial effects” (1960: 279).  The main
pictorial effects that enabled this realism can be linked to the new understanding and
use of parallax.
34 One of Kepler’s “artful observations” is exemplary to see how the discovery of the lunar
spots  in  early  modern  painting  manipulates  parallax  effects  to  disentangle  the
enunciation marks of the observer. Using a set of telescopic lenses in a camera obscura,
in 1604 Kepler reported that “the Moon made an image of itself” (se ipsam pingebat), as
if  painting  itself  on  a  piece  of  paper  (2000:  259).  In  this  process,  not  only  the
“underlying paper” (subjecta  papyrus)  replaces the observer as a subject,  but “it  was
from moving the paper that the spot was first discovered” (ibid.). The “spot” (macula) is
compared to the round-shaped Hebrew letter  Samech,  breaking with the pareidolic
tradition of the face of the Moon. As the identification and interpretation of the spot are
derived  “from the  movement  of  the  paper”  (ex  motu  papyri),  we  can  say  that  it  is
“discovered”  (agnita)  once  it  is  differentiated from  possible  marks  of  the  projection
surface,  namely  from  the  enunciation  marks  of  the  observer  as  a  moving  subject.
Through  artificial  parallax,  in  other  words,  Kepler’s  observation  demonstrates  the
semiotic reality of the image. This is a significant difference from Brunelleschi’s device,
which required a fixed position of the observer to create the illusion of reality. At the
same time, this is consistent with a circular argument on the apparent absence of stellar
parallax, where the enunciation marks of a moving observer cannot be differentiated
from the process of observation and are deleted or concealed in its history.
35 While conceding that the study of “visual differences” (visuali differenze) is essential for
the analysis of appearances, Galileo argues that it cannot provide sufficient evidence to
discriminate  between  images  and  real  things.  In  his  pamphlet  on  the  comets,  he
endorsed the position of “the monkey that firmly believed he saw another monkey in a
mirror”, only to hold on a definition of reality as what lies “behind the mirror” (1960:
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232).  The monkey is an artless Narcissus: “if  simple appearances can determine the
essence of a thing”, as the astronomer writes of the apparent lack of parallax of the
comets, then we can believe that “the suns, moons, and stars seen in still water or in a
mirror are true suns, real moons, and actual stars” (ibid. 233). In this way, Galileo set
himself on a divergent trajectory from the arts of his time, to the point of ignoring
Kepler’s  interpretation  of  the  cosmological  motions  out  of  an  “aesthetic  attitude”
(Panofsky 1956: 13). To be sure, as modern perspective put painting in front of a mirror,
the  Baroque  elaborated  on  the  classical  trope  of  art  as  the  “ape  of  nature”  and
redefined realism as a “wise imitation” (imitatio sapiens) of appearances, as suggested by
Giovanni Bellori (2015: 215). It was the art of a “semiotic animal” (Eco 1986: 202).
 
4. Bruno’s semiotic embrace: the stars and the minds
36 An aesthetics that explores the possibility of representing the change of perspective in
images, while assuming this change as a seal of realism, logically foregrounds the role of
memory to  provide  unity  and  continuity  to  the  visual  experience.  In  the  late
Renaissance, we find in Giordano Bruno’s work one the most innovative elaborations of
the “art of memory” (ars memoriae). With the methodological openness of semiotics,
which enabled a transdisciplinary or even heretical research in the arts and science of
his time, he developed a system of “cosmic memory” (Wildgen 1998) from a theory of
the movement of images. His vision encompasses the cosmological and the cognitive sides
of the Copernican revolution—“the stars and the minds” (astra mentesque),  as Cicero
wrote of Aristotle (Academica I.vii, 26); and his legacy reaches into the project on the
early  modern  memory  of  classical  images  that  Warburg  called  Mnemosyne  Atlas
(1924-1929).
37 Bruno’s art of memory is condensed in his last published work, On the Composition of
Images, Signs and Ideas (1591). The encyclopaedic ambition of this little book is matched
by  its  esoteric  complexity,  and  the  author  warns  that  “probably  no  one  will
comprehend everything in all modes, unless [s]he shall also perhaps so believe” (Bruno
1991:  6).  The  system  thrives  on  the  “marvelous  kinship”  of  the  arts:  “For  true
philosophy,  music  or  poetry  is  also  painting,  and  true  painting  is  also  music  and
philosophy” (ibid. 129). Dick Higgins and Charles Doria introduced it as “intermedial, as
it  were,  between  philosophy  and  work  of  art”  (ibid.  xlviii).  In  fact,  this  book  is
profoundly  intermedial  in  its  method,  which  marks  a  semiotic  turn in  philosophy
(Sturlese 1990). Through semiotics, the art of memory becomes a method to think in
images and a model of “how images think” (Burnett 2004).  The sublime simplicity of
metaphysics,  in  which  the mind  can  “enfold  itself”  in  images  without  sensible
mediations (Bruno 1991: 4), is turned into an art of semiotic complexity, which discloses
the mind’s “embrace” (complexus) of sense as “the condition of those things that do the
signifying” (ibid. 31).
38 With an Aristotelian formula, Bruno starts from the principle that “for one who wishes
to know something, it is proper to speculate on the phantasm” (ibid. 18), namely on the
images that  “imagination”  (phantasia)  draws from the  senses,  called  phantasmata.  In
general,  these images may be defined by contrast with pictures,  as William Mitchell
suggests, precisely as “what can be lifted off the picture” and transferred onto different
media (2005: 85). In the Neoplatonic tradition, which tinges Bruno’s Latin sources and
overall views, the allegory of the cave represents the process that inscribes the shadows of
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image  formation in  the  life  of  the  mind.  In  this  regard,  Bruno’s  art  can  be  closely
compared  to  that  of  his  contemporary  Giovan  Battista  Della  Porta,  a  professor  of
secrets who became famous all over Europe with his book on Natural magic (1558). In his
Art  of  Remembering  (1566),  Della  Porta  writes  that  memory  images  are  “animated
pictures” (pittura animata) of the world that are projected, through the “windows” of
the senses, into the camera obscura of the head: like a painter, imagination fixes them
on that “lively canvas that we call the brain” (2012: 89, 98). Similarly, Bruno writes that
imagination is, like a painter, an “establisher of infinite images” on the “surfaces of
sense” (1991: 129)—although a simple (and not unusual) print error may have changed
the “formative power” (efformator) of imagination into an “establisher” (effirmator) of
images.  Analogy is  what  allows  the  philosopher  to  connect  “surfaces  and essences”
(Hofstadter & Sander 2013).
39 In more technical terms, we should understand Bruno’s images with the Aristotelian
analogy that  thinking is  like  “making a  diagram” (De memoria 450a3).  In  his  art  of
memory,  accordingly,  to  think  means  to  speculate  on diagrams.  These  are  “moving
pictures of thought”, as Peirce called them (CP 4.8), but they do not have only a logical
function,  as  they  draw  on  the  sensible  complexity of  the  arts  to  make  “imagination
pulsate and move” (Bruno 1879-1891: II.1, 229). We can find numerous and remarkable
diagrams in Bruno’s works. Many of them are etched by his own hand and printed in
reverse or negative,  namely as  white lines on a black background.  Not only was this
technique easier for a non-professional carver, as he was, but it reveals a certain way of
thinking in images, which converges to the aesthetics of the Baroque: the white lines
set  the  “moving  pictures  of  thought”  against  a  dark  cosmic  background,  like
astrological  maps or  the photos in Warburg’s  Atlas.  Also,  these diagrams are richly
ornate, combining geometrical shapes with symbolic natural forms, like flowers, hearts
and stars, in a kind of living geometry that Bruno called “zoemetry” (Yates 1964: 343).
Unfortunately,  the  modern  editors  of  his  Latin  works  converted  his  diagrams  into
positive  prints,  with black drawing lines  against  a  white  background,  and removed
what they saw as meaningless flourishes. The speculative value of the ornaments was lost,
as it was in the white, quiet, and idealized simplicity of Neoclassical statues.
40 One of the fundamental diagrams of Bruno’s system is that of the atrium, imagined as
the  open-sky  courtyard  that  lets  light  into the  temple  of  Mnemosyne.  From  these
courtyards and the relative cubicles and fields,  as Frances Yates commented, Bruno
builds “an architectural system of terrible complexity” (1966: 295). This is not just a
system of rooms and places to store images, like paintings or statues in the classical art
of memory: it is the movement of the mind in this imaginary space that makes the sense of
images.  As in a Copernican version of Leonardo’s “Vitruvian Man”, the architectural
square of each atrium is combined with the circular orbits of the planets and the stars,
ornate with signs and associated with mythological figures that orient interpretation.
At its centre, Bruno places “the earth and the eye” (1991: 46), namely matter and mind:
the whole universe is seen from this double, living, and impersonal centre of speculation –
and it  is  suggestive that the Vitruvian architecture would expect  a  shallow pool  of
rainwater at the centre of the atrium.
41 In  its  “full  significance”,  as  Bruno writes,  the  universe  is  “a  sort  of  living  mirror”
(speculum quoddam vivens), in which the mind finds “the image of the natural and the
shadow of the divine” (ibid. 10). The philosopher upholds the teaching of the apostle
Paul  (1  Corinthians 13:12):  “now  we  see  through  a  mirror,  darkly”  ( di’  esoptrou  en
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ainigmati), as on a surface of polished metal. However, the obscure and indirect vision of
the world, as we experience it “now” (arti), is re-enunciated as a principle of aesthetic
knowledge:  we  think  in  images,  through the  shadows  that  reveal  the  substance  of
images.  The  signs  of  the  divine  presence,  apparently  absent  to  the  senses,  can  be
disclosed by means of “discourse and reflection” (Bruno 1991: 5). And the possibility of
seeing the truth and beauty of the world “face to face” (prosōpon pros prosōpon), which
the apostle deferred to the time of revelation, is raised with a cosmic vertigo of the mind
that speculates on images, facing the universe as in a cosmic Brunelleschian device.
42 The analogy of the mirror is semiotic in multiple ways. First, it is used to manipulate 
the difference between real presence and representation, as Lotman explains: “A face in
the mirror does not share the natural associations of a real face—it cannot be touched
or caressed, but it can easily be included in semiotic associations—it can be abused or
used for magic manipulations” (1990: 54). As such, the mirror enables Bruno to develop
an “analogous definition of the arts of memory and magic” (Mertens 2018: XV). The
mirror also functions as a plane of signification that captures the “movement of images”
(imaginum momentum), as Bruno writes (1991: 16). Before and beyond representation,
images  signify  the  connection  of  all  things  in  a  continuous,  infinite  process  of
interpretation and transformation, from the invisible elements to the point-like distant
stars.  The art  of  memory aims to harness this  process of  universal  semiosis.  Bruno
cannot present in detail the system of “vehicles and chains” (vehicula et vincula) that
reflects  the  movement  of  the  stars  and  the  minds  at  different  semiotic  levels  of
immanence, “as in a mirror” (ut in speculo), but he is eager to make the point that “the
planets seem to seek out similar faces to their own in subjective and informing things
according to the counsel and practice of the Magi” (ibid. 17).
43 In the cosmological embrace of the art of memory, the Moon is marked as a “subjective
and informing” threshold of Bruno’s speculations—and it is a felicitous convention that
one of its rayed craters on the far side now bears his name (Saiber 2005: 44-45). Like a
mirror,  the Moon is  an “intermediary body” (Coccia  2016:  16)  of  the cosmic life  of
images. As it reflects both the light of the Sun and the shadows of the Earth, it also
combines the movement that is “signified in us”, as Ficino put it, with the movement that we
signify in images. Bruno writes that the mind ascends from the sensible shadows to the
divine ideas, and vice versa it descends, “in the same way that we descend from the Sun
to the aspect of the Moon’s light, which is imparted by the stars and the air, and from it
we move down to the shadowy light, or as in a mirror” (1991: 16). This cosmic movement
of images gives a new spin to the Platonic idea of “saving the phenomena”, as debated in
Plutarch’s dialogue on The Face that Appears on the Moon (923A), namely to the effort of
saving the motions of the celestial bodies from the quality of mere appearances, as they
would be if the universe was at rest while the Earth in motion.
44 For  Bruno,  in  fact,  the  Earth  and the  Moon are  not  only  similar,  but  they  form a
semiotic system of double planets that is pivotal to his view of the whole universe. This
may be well illustrated by a striking misreading of a Copernican diagram. In a passage
of the dialogue entitled The Ash Wednesday Supper (1584), Bruno argued that the small
point that we can see on the third celestial  sphere of that diagram did not “mean”
(significava) the position of the Earth, but simply “the mark made by the foot of the
compass during the drawing of the epicycle of the Earth and the Moon: the epicycle
being the same for them both” (2018: 165). He was wrong, both from the physical and
the philological point of view, and yet somehow coherent with the Copernican way of
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rethinking  the  universe  by  way  of  “eccentrics  and  epicycles”  (1985:  81).  In  his
misreading, not only the Earth is displaced from the centre of universe and replaced by
the Sun, but its meaning and position are determined on the same epicycle of the Moon.
45 Crucially,  this system of double planets allows Bruno to extend the evidence of the
Moon’s parallax to all the celestial bodies, including the so-called fixed stars: their lack
of observable parallax cannot be an indication of the Earth’s immobility, and it must be
due to their distance. We know that Galileo will try to measure stellar parallax with the
technique of the “double stars” (Hirshfeld 2013:  132),  but he could not obtain solid
evidence;  instead,  he  used the  movement  of  water during the  tides  as  “an Ersatz for
parallax”  (Koestler  1959:  465),  although  he  discarded  the  correct  theory  of  the
gravitational attraction of the Moon. Like Galileo, Bruno suggested that “the Moon is a
sign of these things, but not their cause” (2018: 175). They were wrong for the tides, but
their semiotic argument may still be valid: we are always looking at a finger that points
at the Moon, when we are observing parallax, namely we can only speculate on images.
46 By embedding parallax in the composition of images, Bruno expands the art of memory
from a static  model,  which “does not  interchange [ou parallattousi]  the signs of  the
senses”, as we read in Plato’s Theaetetus (194d8), into a dynamic, cosmic and creative
system  of  visual  semiotics.  In  this  system,  the  meaning  of  images is  not  the
representation of  things,  but  a  positional  figure  of  the  mind relative  to  an  impersonal
substance of signification, which “abides in movement and quantity, even if by itself it
neither moves nor is moved” (Bruno 1991: 4). With Jacques Fontanille, we can say that
this is a system of “living signification”, centred around “a perceiving body that takes a
position in  the  world  of  meaning”  (2006:  1-2).  As  it  takes  position,  the  living  body
modifies the field of presence, and memory retraces these sensible deformations in images.
47 A positional reading of Bruno’s composition of images can be further developed from
the Aristotelian distinction between general “memory” (mnēmē), which is based on the
retention and recovery of sensible impressions, and “reminiscence” (anamnēsis), whose
object is the initial “motion” (kinēsis) of a sequence of changes in our body that generates
an  “idea”  (De  memoria  451b12-25).  In  reminiscence,  as  Aristotle  writes,  we  “hunt”
(thēreuomen) for ideas, as we follow the sensible, temporal inscriptions of our body in images.
Neoplatonic reminiscence elaborates on this cognitive model with the metaphor of the
dark woods that represent “matter” (hylē), and understands “the practice of philosophy
as a process  of  tracking,  pursuing and hunting the traces  of  divine presence in  the
material world” (Rowland 2002: 111). This is for Bruno the essence of a semiotic art:
memory is a system of uttered enunciation; reminiscence tries to capture the “impulse to
signify” (motum significatum),  as  he calls  it  (1991:  24),  which inscribes the process  of
enunciation into  the  forms  of  “signified  memory”  (Dondero  2020:  30,  n. 40).  The
philosopher is after the movement of ideas, not the similarity of icons.
48 The myth of Narcissus takes on a whole new meaning in this context. A painting of the
beautiful hunter appears at the heart of Panel 34 of the Mnemosyne Atlas, in a sequence
of tapestries dedicated to hunting and dated 1929, when Warburg discovered Bruno as a
“thinker  in  images”  (bildhafter  Denker)  (WIA,  GC/22737).  If  we  define  a  myth  as  a
memory-enhancing narrative, Narcissus represents for Bruno the speculative mind that
fails to embrace itself on the mirror of nature—while the cognate myth of Actaeon, who
sees  the  goddess  Artemis  bathing  in  the  spring  of  a  sacred  cave,  expresses  the
understanding of their identity, the hunter becoming prey, as Bruno explains at length
in his Heroic Frenzies (Eroici furori,  1585: I.4). At the same time, the apparent failure of
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identification of  Narcissus  with  his  own  image  is  a  force  of  “living  enunciation”
(Fontanille 2006: 36), which inscribes the gaze of the hunter in a transformative point
of view of the image on itself. It is heroic in its own semiotic and speculative terms.
49 In Bruno’s work, significant references to the myth of Narcissus can be found in two
scientific poems, published in the same year as his book on Images, Signs and Ideas. In the
first poem, on the invisible elements (De minimo, 1591), Bruno conceives the atom as a
“minimal mirror” (minimum specillum) of the universe, and argues that the science of
his time could not fathom this minimal, reflexive and impersonal point of view, “just like
Narcissus  his  face,  the  body its  shadow” (1879-1891:  I.3,  235).  We can say  that  the
shadow stands for the “minimal difference” of an object relative to itself, as in Žižek’s
definition of the parallax view (2006: 18). This is complemented by the second poem,
devoted to the immensurable and “unfigurable” universe (De immenso, 1591): its visible
limits ultimately coincide with the lack of  observable parallax of the so-called fixed
stars. Here, Bruno writes that the shadow is a “vertigo of the body” (1879-1891: I.1,
317), and compares the “apparent vertigo of the world” (apparens mundi vertigo) to that
of Narcissus, who “tries to embrace” his own shadow on the “underlying waves” (in
undis subiectis): between the subject and the shadow there is “nothing but the plane”
(praeter planum nihil); images move on it like waves on a “sheet of water” (nappe d’eau),
as in Saussure’s diagram of the semiotic plane (1966: 112).
50 In this reading, the star-crossed embrace of Narcissus contains a vertiginous parallax
view of the Copernican universe. When we experience vertigo, that is, our head spins
and the world around us seems to move, while the ground under our feet fluctuates. In
a similar way, when Bruno explains the motion of the celestial bodies, the parallax view
is a way of embracing the “imaginary face” of phantasmata, as he writes, and this face is
as real as the reflection of the “fortress of reason” on the “font of sense” (1879-1891: I.2,
25). Two centuries before Kant’s “Copernican revolution” in the way we think about
phenomena,  Bruno suggests that we can only speculate on phantasmata.  With this,  the
apparently absent parallax of the stars is inscribed in the movement of images as a
structure  of  desire ( de  sideribus),  for  “everything  which  desires  or  lacks  something
moves  towards  the  thing  desired,  and—as  far  as  possible—converts  itself  into  it”
(Bruno 2018: 174).
 
5. Caravaggio’s poetic invention: what is it like to be an
image?
51 In the transition of the Renaissance from the empirical “world of the more-or-less”
(monde de l’à-peu-près) to the modern “universe of precision” (Koyré 1971), science still
was, and crucially, an art of approximations. At the same time, painting could hold an
even stronger claim to realism, since the technical advancements in the production of
optical  instruments  enabled  the  projection  of  images  from  the  real  world  onto
canvasses. In the development of modern realism in painting, around 1600, Caravaggio
represents a defining case in point. His Roman patron, Cardinal Francesco del Monte,
owned copies of the optical writings of Leonardo and Della Porta, among others, and
some of the finest mirrors of the time. As always, changes in the relationship between
perception and modes of representation do not follow from an individual style,  but
Caravaggio captured the “period eye” of the Baroque with the vision of an avant-garde
artist.
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52 According  to  a  controversial  yet  reasonable  and  documented  hypothesis  by  David
Hockney, Caravaggio’s Roman canvasses display the marks of a dramatic advance in the
optics of the camera obscura.  The refinement of concave mirrors and convex lenses,
which project a real image on a surface—instead of the virtual image located behind a
flat  mirror—,  enabled  Caravaggio  to  develop  his  paintings  directly  on  the  canvas,
without  preliminary drawings,  using little  incisions and white  touches as  reference
points through different sessions. Despite the unease of painting images upside-down,
the geometric visions of the Renaissance became more lifelike. The intellectual mastery
of  drawing  gave  way  to  a  new  sense  of  colour  that  was,  at  once,  emotional  and
materialistic, endowing figures with softer contours and stronger contrasts. With the
best  lenses  of  this  period,  however,  the  maximum  usable  image  was  30cm  across
(Hockney 2006: 103)—a measure that coincides with that of Brunelleschi’s perspective
panel. Bigger canvasses had to be composed through a montage of different parts, like
Galileo did with his drawings of the Moon. The cinematic nature of this montage opens
Caravaggio’s paintings to a dynamic analysis of their structure (Careri 2016), but the
moving focus also caused the formation of perspective “errors”, as Alberti would call
them. While these errors may be interpreted as stylistic choices, as some critics have
suggested, it can be safely argued that the new technique introduces parallax effects in
painting,  and  it  does  so  through  an  impersonal  device that  inscribes  a  movement  of
reflection in the composition of images.
53 The use of optical devices in Caravaggio’s painting is no longer “secret knowledge”, as
Hockney  presents  it  and  as  it  was  for  Della  Porta  (Lapucci  2005).  Caravaggio’s
contemporaries witnessed that he transformed his studio into a dark room, making a
hole in the ceiling to create a direct and intense source of sunlight. Recent studies show
that he also used light-sensitive chemicals in his colours, like silver salts, which allowed
him to work in the dark during the projections. His ceiling painting of Jupiter, Neptune,
and Pluto (ca. 1597), in the distillery of a villa owned by Del Monte, suggests “a process
that could chemically-fix an image created inside a camera obscura”, as Susan Grundy
explains: the three gods respectively signify sulphur (air),  mercury (water), and salt
(earth), while the “significant ingredient of silver (as a salt, iodide or nitrate) is alluded
to by the presence of the Moon”, depicted at the centre of “a crystal-like ball, which
could itself  be a  reference to a  lens” (Hockney at  al. 2009:  31).  The gods appear in
audacious  foreshortening  from  below,  and  it  is  likely  that  they  are  based  on  self-
portraits of  the  painter  as  seen on a  flat  mirror  on the  floor.  This  the  only  ceiling
painting by Caravaggio, but it provides a broader context for the cosmological vision
that he developed from the alchemy that made sublunary bodies shine like stars.
54 Although overlooked by Hockney, a small canvas acquires a paradigmatic position in
this history of optics in painting. This is also one of the most “Brunian” of Caravaggio’s
works (Ordine 2009: 231-241), belonging to the decisive period when the philosopher
was in Rome—before his “emphatically manneristic” burning in 1600 (Panofsky 1995:
67). The painting is the Narcissus (ca. 1597-1599), re-discovered by Roberto Longhi at
the beginning of the twentieth century and attributed to Caravaggio as one of his “most
personal  poetic  inventions”  (1999:  I,  213).  Promoting  the  analogy  of  cinema  in  art
history, Longhi suggested that the painter’s “descriptions of light and shadows” are,
precisely, “photograms” of a film (ibid. 69). His pupil and film-maker Pier Paolo Pasolini
pushed the analogy further, and wrote that Caravaggio invented “profilmic” painting,
in which the reality as a whole is reflected as in a “cosmic mirror” (1999: 2674), from the
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hole of an apple to the eye of an angel. The Narcissus stages the representation of this
profilmic,  cosmic  mirror  inside  the  painter’s  camera  obscura,  with  a  cinematographic
meditation on temporality, presence, and transience.
55 The myth of Narcissus was notably associated with the art of painting by Alberti. As he
writes  (2011:  46),  he  liked  to  say  that  the  beautiful  hunter  was  the  “inventor  of
painting” for two reasons: the first one is that, according to the “whole tale” of the
poets, Narcissus was “transformed into a flower”, and painting is “the flower of all the
arts”; the second reason is that to paint means “to catch with art that surface of the
spring”,  as  in  a  mirror.  Victor  Stoichita  noted  that  “the  embracing  of  the  mirror
(amplector/abbracciare)  contrasts  radically  with  the  outlining  of  the  shadow
(circumscribere/circonscrivere)”,  which  was  classically  regarded  as  the  first  idea  of
painting, because the subject of the reflection is “the same and not the other” (1997a:
39). Caravaggio shows that the contrast may not be as radical as it seems. We can say
that his  poetic  invention is  that of  a  semiotic  embrace of  the  mirror,  where the same
emerges as a minimal difference from its shadows, like Bruno’s memory images painted
on the “surfaces of sense”.  We do not see the final  transformation, the flower that
stands for a body, but we do glimpse the “whole tale” from the sombre tones of the
reflection. The flower is signified by the “coming to the surface” (affiorare) of form from
colour, that is, from the temporal vicissitudes of light. Longhi wrote that Caravaggio thus
inaugurated “a new notion of action” in painting, where “tonal hieroglyphs” replace
drawing with “a surfacing of eager gestures that pierce the canvas deeply” (1995: 128);
and  Françoise  Bardon  suggested  that  the  Narcissus represents  a  theory  of  “spatial
‘emergence’,  which  can  retrospectively  be  said  to  consist  of  a  synthesis  between
Bruno’s materialism and Galileo’s search for general laws” (Bal 1999: 239).
56 A  translation  of  Ovid’s  Metamorphoses,  which  inspired  many  artists  in  the  late
Renaissance, could be one of the twelve books listed among Caravaggio’s household
possessions in Rome. The Narcissus interweaves some essential narrative threads of the
myth, as told in this poem (III, 337-510), like one of Warburg’s tapestries. The beautiful
hunter is transfixed on a “silvery pool” (fons argenteus), “hanging motionless” over his
own reflection, his eyes burning with desire like “twin stars”. The water is perfectly
still and clear; in the darkness of its depths, the boy gauges his destiny and his origin,
as the son of a river god and a water nymph. Surrounded by trees and plants, the pool
is a kind of natural camera obscura. Caravaggio knows “how the likeness of a vision that
is seen in the water may be seen hanging without in the air, by the help of certain
glasses  of  diverse  fashions”,  as  Della  Porta  wrote  (1957:  3):  the  “hanging  image”
(pendula imago) is the real image projected by a mirror-lens. This is a new art of shadows,
close to the origins of cinema, and its reflections in early modern painting renew the
wonder of “the earliest Neanderthal Narcissus” (Edgerton 2009: 24).
57 Caravaggio represents Narcissus on his knees, embracing his own image in a full circle,
which is almost perfectly divided in two mirroring halves. Prior figurative instances of
this  pose  can  be  encountered  in  an  illustration  of  the  Metamorphoses translated  by
Lodovico Dolce (1553), or in an engraving by Tommaso Barlacchi (Marini 1989: 443), but
the reflection is missing in the first case, while in the second case it is too vague, and
we only see the head and the chest. The circular shape is obviously symbolic of “self-
love”  (philautia),  which  must  be  here  understood  without  the  negative  moral
connotations of the iconological tradition: for Bruno, it was the fundamental “bond”
(vinculum) of desire in the movement of images (1991: 283, n. 3); and it captures the
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circularity of the experience with mirrors and signs, as discussed by Eco. The semiotics
of perception, reflection, and desire flows under the Baroque sense of balance achieved
by this painting.
58 Over  the  water  line,  the  two  halves  appear  perfectly  symmetrical,  but  their
composition  reveals  subtle  fluctuations.  In  the  first  place,  we  can  imagine  that
Caravaggio painted the figure of Narcissus upside-down, as it would appear by a direct
projection in his dark room, namely as it were the reflection in the final painting. The
semi-circular figure  can be  compared to  that  of  the  Conversion  of  St  Paul (ca. 1600),
where the apostle lies on his back, his eyes shut, embracing the divine light like the
water of a baptismal font—but this painting is double in size, and the right arm is out of
proportion, perhaps because of a movement of the mirror-lens beyond the sweet spot
of the usable image. Subsequently, Caravaggio turned the canvas and copied it as the
reflection. A vertical incision fixed the position of the body in the lower half-circle. At
first sight, the reflection appears simply reversed “as on a playing card”, as Rossella
Vodret describes it (1998: 63), just without the rotation that one finds in the modern
card designs:  this could have been done more easily by repeating the process after
turning the canvas. In fact, the reflection is a modified copy of the image in the upper half:
the distance between the face and the knees is larger, but the overall distance between
the shoulders and the water line is approximately the same, so that observers do not
perceive this difference immediately. The reflection is a space for pictorial thinking,
and the pentimenti are markers of its process of enunciation.
59 Reflectography shows that both knees were originally painted in the reflection, and
they initially anchored the “guesswork” of the painter (Cardinali 2019: 61). This is a
significant change. When Caravaggio moved the reflected knees upwards, as in the final
composition, the receding plane of the clothed knee disappeared under the water line,
signifying depth and death at once. In this sense, the bare knee performs the semiotic
function of “providing a semblance of presence to absent beings” (Damisch 2010: 304),
which was for Alberti  the essence of  a  portrait.  More precisely,  it  makes present a
double absence,  as explained by Mieke Bal: the disappearance of the other knee in the
darkness of the pool, and the lack of another head, as the knee looks like “a neck without
a head on it” (1999: 243). In the materiality of its colour, which condenses the light of
the golden background of Caravaggio’s Basket of Fruit (ca. 1597), the bare knee is the
“golden core” (croceum medium) of the transformation, the sign of a flower that will
take the name of Narcissus, while his body melts away like wax under the sun. We can
find a suggestive correspondence in the Conversion of Mary Magdalene (ca. 1598), where a
window is reflected as a square of light on a convex mirror: in a frontal view of this
mirror, the light would appear at the centre of the semi-circle of the hand, like the
knee of Narcissus is at the centre of the embrace.
60 With its reflection, the knee marks a double and impersonal centre of the painting, like
“the earth and the eye” inscribed at the centre of Bruno’s atrium—and like the foot of a
cosmic compass, it signifies the apparent failure of identification in the epicycle of the
heads, where Narcissus embraces the Moon. Against a cosmic background, in fact, the
bare knee looks like the faint reflection of a disappearing Moon that we can detect in
the spring of Caravaggio’s Rest on the Flight into Egypt (ca. 1595). A revelatory term of
comparison is the Flight into Egypt by Adam Elsheimer, painted in Rome in 1609. Here,
the silver light of the Moon gives the sense of direction to the whole scene, which
unfolds from right to left,  and the night setting allows Elsheimer to display a clear
Narcissus and the Moon: Parallax in Early Modern Images
Signata, 12 | 2021
20
parallax  effect  on  the  vertical  axis:  the  Moon  reflected  on  the  water  is  not
perpendicular to the Moon in the sky, and it appears in a different position relative to
the trees. Likewise, in the Narcissus,  the reflected knee is moved upwards, trying to
integrate the different points of view of the water and the observer. The main reason
for  Caravaggio’s  changes  in  the  reflection  is,  precisely,  the  imitation  of  a  change  of
perspective, namely an effort to include parallax effects as markers of realism.
61 Despite Caravaggio’s  adjustments of  the reflection,  a  photograph of  the same scene
would display a very different view, showing the lower part of the chin, the nostrils
and, more importantly, the open eye looking at itself. A little sketch of Narcissus by
Cigoli  (Louvre,  INV 905r)—who also painted the first  Galilean Moon from telescopic
observations—shows the reflection on the water as it would likely appear to an external
observer.  “Painters  often  deceive  themselves,  by  representing  water  in  which  they
make the water reflect the objects seen by the man”, as Leonardo had already noted
(1970: 239): in other words, painters cannot represent what “the water sees” (l’acqua
vede) by simply reversing an image. From the point of view of both the observers and
Narcissus, we should expect something like the ceiling painting in Del Monte’s villa.
One wonders why Caravaggio did not use the same technique. Part of the answer is that
the reflection of Narcissus is not just the view of a delegated observer, but the observer is
a delegated Narcissus. Caravaggio exploits the painter’s self-deception to a greater effect:
the observers of the painting are not meant to see the reflection of a real body, but an
image that sees itself as a real image.  The difference goes easily unnoticed, the painter
deceives  the  observers  in  plain  sight,  as  he  did  in  The  Cardsharps  (ca. 1595):  in  the
triangle between the internal and the external point of view, the value of the cards that
we cannot glimpse can be derived from all the other cards that we see.
62 This raises an important point on Caravaggio’s realism. “Given the non-realistic nature
of  the  reflection”,  Vodret  suggests  that  “this  Narcissus  may  even  be  a  self-portrait
executed using two mirrors” (1998: 60). One of the advantages of this hypothesis is that
it helps to move away from the principle that the realism of the reflection depends on
the similarity of the head, while the painter makes us focus on the pivotal difference of the
knee, as it is expressed in its parallax. To be sure, the “hanging head” in the reflection
of Narcissus is as real as that of the giant in Caravaggio’s several versions of David and
Goliath, and this head is often identified with that of the painter. There are two notable
examples: in the earliest version (ca. 1597-1599, Madrid),  the composition of David’s
body “like a spanner” (a chiave inglese) conjures the embrace of Narcissus (Longhi 1999:
II, 89); in one of the last versions (ca. 1609-1610, Rome), Caravaggio painted the head of
Goliath as “a portrait of himself” (Bellori 2005: 182), and David is a messenger asking the
revocation of the papal price on the painter’s head. It is a form of indirect discourse: the
painting says that this is the head of the painter.
63 The focus on the knee allows us to disengage the supposition of self-portraiture from the
assumption  that  “every  painter  paints  himself”,  which  was  an  idée  reçue of  the
Renaissance.  What  emerges  is  a  structure  of  reflexive  but  impersonal  enunciation  that
performs the double meaning of a signum,  as Ovid calls it,  namely a “statue” and a
“sign”. In this respect, it is relevant that the pose of Narcissus may also be based on two
lost ancient statues, and the head inspired by a Roman statue that was widely imitated
in  the  Renaissance,  perhaps  from  a copy  in  Del  Monte’s  collection  (Marini  1989:
442-443).  The sources  are  multiple  and,  precisely,  speculative.  We can say  that  the
reflection of the knee articulates the minimal difference of a real image as a sign of itself,
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and  this  difference  coincides  with  the  coming  to  the  surface  of  plastic  values  in
painting.
64 As much as the knees, the two eyes that we see in the painting are those of a profile in
reflection. This is not a monocular projection, but a representation of the difference
between  two  points  of  view  over  a  plane  of  living  signification.  This  is  an  essential
semiotic  strategy  that  Caravaggio  employs  for  “the  destruction of  historical
representation through a display of the eye that sees and stupefies itself”, as argued by
Louis  Marin (1995:  29),  and it  also  shows how the semiotics  of  the  “living mirror”
replaces metaphysics, as Bruno described it. In the first place, the observer is nothing
but a double of the image that sees itself, not a virtual substitute of the painter’s point of
view, as it is generally assumed. It can even be argued that the circular composition,
just like a mirror-lens, transforms the observers into projections of the painting. The
failure of identification is only a matter of point of view, then, and it enables a new
kind of felt imitation: Narcissus embraces his own substance as “the shadow of an image”
(imaginis umbra), as Ovid writes. In fact, what the beautiful hunter tries to capture is not
one single, still image, but a sequence of “fleeting images” (simulacra fugacia), a living
phantasmagoria of himself. The comparison with cinema is inevitably imprecise, but it
offers a good approximation to the poetics of Caravaggio’s painting. 
65 The comparison can be developed with a key idea from Pasolini’s film semiotics, which
displays a Brunian art of “heretical empiricism” with a Caravaggesque sense of realism.
This idea concerns one of the most prominent techniques of a “film of poetry”, namely
the  “free  indirect  point-of-view shot”  (soggettiva  indiretta  libera),  as  Pasolini  calls  it
(1988: 176), by analogy with the free indirect discourse of a literary text. It is a form of
subjective but impersonal enunciation, in which “somebody says [or sees] that somebody
else  says  [or  sees]  the  same  thing”  (Paolucci  2010:  409-410).  In  Ovid’s  poem,  the
reflection is inexorably silent, but it returns all the “signs” (signa) that Narcissus makes;
he sees all the movements of his body while his eyes appear fixed on himself, so that he
feels to be the moving image that he sees in a subjective, impersonal and reflexive act of
identification: “I am he! I have felt it” (Iste ego sum! sensi). Caravaggio achieves a similar
effect with his camera obscura: the reflection makes us feel the actions and passions of
the image, interweaving the gaze of the observer with that of Narcissus “like a Persian
carpet” (Pasolini 1988: 89). We observe a certain scene as if we were inside it, but we
also “feel the camera”, as Pasolini writes, so that we can experience our point of view as
a pure difference within a discourse that reality makes on itself.
66 By  way  of  a  tentative  conclusion,  we  can  say  that  a  new  observer  emerges  inside
Caravaggio’s camera obscura. As the background is reduced to a dark cosmic surface, the
reflection shifts from optics to semiotics. The movement of the observer is inscribed in an
image  that  appears  motionless  but  sees  and  feels  itself  as  a  moving  image—more
precisely,  an  image  that  moves  relative  to  itself.  Through this  experience,  Caravaggio
invented a new archetype of the “self-aware image” (Stoichita 1997b), one that allows
us  to  rethink  the  emergence  of  a  “Baroque  consciousness”  (Kersten 1997)  from an
impersonal  and  reflexive  point  of  view in  the  process  of  visual  enunciation.  A  semiotic
consciousness of images comes to the surface, and its rule of thumb can be expressed with
Thomas Nagel (1974), as follows: we may assume that something is conscious if there is
“something that it is like” to be that thing. Narcissus learns what it is like to be an image,
and perhaps we can learn from its reflection that “we all are waves” too, as Welby made
us consider (1983: xvii).
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ABSTRACTS
This essay develops a comprehensive approach to the study of parallax effects in early modern
images, with critical emphasis on painting. Parallax is the apparent displacement of an object
relative to a given background, as caused by the movement of the observer. In the cosmological
debate that accompanied the Copernican revolution, the apparent absence of stellar parallax was
taken as decisive evidence against the hypothesis of the motion of the Earth. Surprisingly, the
emergence of a parallax view in the early modern arts has not been considered in relation to this
crucial  scientific  debate,  and  it  is  still  largely  understudied.  In  this  context,  this  essay  puts
forward  a  twofold  argument:  first,  it  contends  that  the  debate  on  stellar  parallax  informs,
integrates, and transforms the theory of perspective in the late Renaissance; second, it argues
that the parallax view sheds new light on the representation of movement in the Baroque visual
culture.  The semiotic  model of  uttered enunciation provides  a  methodological  framework to
study the inscription of a moving observer in images, and the question of the semiotic nature of
mirrors finds here a new pertinence.  This framework is  developed with a focus on Giordano
Bruno’s art of memory, where the parallax view enables a semiotic embrace of the movement of
images. In painting, analysis focuses on Caravaggio’s Narcissus, where the observer is displaced to
reflect the point of view of an image that appears motionless but sees itself as a moving image.
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Cet essai développe une approche d’ensemble pour étudier les effets de parallaxe dans les images
de la première modernité, en portant une attention critique à la peinture. La parallaxe est le
déplacement apparent d’un objet par rapport à un arrière-plan donné, dû au mouvement de
l’observateur.  Dans  le  débat  cosmologique  qui  a  accompagné  la  révolution  copernicienne,
l’absence apparente de parallaxe stellaire était considérée comme une preuve décisive contre
l’hypothèse  du  mouvement  de  la  Terre.  Il  est  surprenant  que  l’émergence  d’une  vision  de
parallaxe dans les arts de la première modernité n’ait pas été prise en compte par rapport à ce
débat scientifique crucial, et elle est encore largement sous-étudiée. Dans ce contexte, cet essai
présente un double argument : premièrement, il soutient que le débat sur la parallaxe stellaire
informe,  intègre  et  transforme  la  théorie  de  la  perspective  à  la  fin  de  la  Renaissance ;
deuxièmement, que la vision de parallaxe jette une nouvelle lumière sur la représentation du
mouvement dans la culture visuelle du Baroque. Le modèle sémiotique de l’énonciation énoncée
fournit un cadre méthodologique pour l’étude de l’inscription dans les images d’un observateur
en mouvement,  et  la question de la nature sémiotique des miroirs trouve ici  une pertinence
nouvelle. Ce cadre est développé à travers l’art de la mémoire de Giordano Bruno, où la parallaxe
permet  d’embrasser  le  mouvement  des  images  d’un  point  de  vue  sémiotique.  En  peinture,
l’analyse se concentre sur le Narcisse de Caravage, où l’observateur est déplacé pour refléter le
point de vue d’une image qui semble immobile mais se voit comme une image en mouvement.
INDEX
Mots-clés: discours scientifique, énonciation, peinture, réflexivité, mouvement
Keywords: scientific discourse, enunciation, painting, reflexivity, movement
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